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Mineral Rights
PatrickH. Martin'

I. LEGISLATION-I994 REGULAR SESSION
A. Act 2-Severance Tax Incentives
Act 2 of 1994 enacts and reenacts portions of Louisiana Revised Statutes
47:633(7),' enacts 47:648.1 through :648.4, and repeals 47:646.1 through
:646.5. 3 This act provides severance tax incentives for certain types of
production and drilling of oil and gas wells. The tax is suspended on crude oil
production from certified stripper wells in a month in which the average posted
price for a thirty-day period is less than $20 per barrel. Severance tax is
suspended for twenty-four months or until payout on horizontally drilled wells.
There is a five-year severance tax exemption on wells returned to service after
having been inactive for more than two years or having had less than thirty-one
days of production during the past two years. Certified new discovery wells,
defined as wildcat wells spudded after September 30, 1994, have severance taxes
suspended for twenty-four months or until payout. The severance tax exemptions
for new oil or gas fields4 are repealed. 5
B. Act 35-Natural Gas Franchise Tax
Act 35 of 1994 amends and reenacts Louisiana Revised Statutes 47:1031
through :1034.6 This act pertains to the natural gas franchise tax on pipelines
transporting gas in Louisiana. The tax is equal to one percent of the gross
receipts from the pipeline's operations in the state. The amendments provide
additional definitions and a new basis for the calculation of the taxes owed.
C. House Concurrent Resolution No. 35-Stripper Wells Transfer Fee
Noting that the imposition of a fee by the state for the transfer of ownership
of stripper wells effectively takes them out of commerce because of the inability
of the owner to recover his costs from the marginal production, the Louisiana
Legislature, in House Concurrent Resolution No. 35,7 authorized and directed
Copyright 1995, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. 1994 La. Acts No. 2, § 1.

2. Id. § 2.
3. Id. § 3.
4. La. R.S. 47:646.1, .5 (1990).
5. 1994 La. Acts No. 2, § 3.
6. 1994 La. Acts No. 35, § 1.
7. H.R. Con. Res. 35, Reg. Sess. (1994).
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the Department of Natural Resources, Office of Conservation, to not impose or
charge a fee for the transfer of ownership of stripper wells.
I1. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

A. Joint Operating Agreement
In Martin Exploration Co. v. Amoco Production Co.,' plaintiff, Martin
Exploration Company (MECO), brought suit against Amoco Production Co.
(Amoco) claiming a contribution of acreage under a joint operating agreement.
Gulf Oil had farmed out certain acreage to Amoco on March 10, 1980, in return
for Amoco drilling a well. MECO and Amoco had entered into a letter
agreement pertaining to the same area. Amoco drilled a well (the Ravenswood.
well) on the Gulf Oil farmout acreage. In August, 1980, MECO agreed to
participate in the cost of the drilling of the Ravenswood well and to execute a
mutually satisfactory operating agreement. In October, 1980, Amoco sent
MECO a proposed operating agreement, the AAPL Form 610-1977, to be
effective as of October 21, 1980. MECO executed the agreement, with revision,
on January 23, 1981, and changed the effective date to January 1, 1980, a fact
Amoco noted but did not change when it executed the agreement. The well was
successful. MECO asserted that, under Article VIII.C (the Contribution Clause)
of the joint operating agreement, Amoco was required to assign a portion of the
Gulf Oil farmout acreage to MECO. Amoco asserted Article III.B of the
operating agreement provided that the interests of the parties in costs, liabilities,
and production of the Ravenswood well would be in accordance with Exhibit A
to the agreement. 9 The trial court agreed with Amoco and the appeals court
affirmed. Exhibit A reflected that the Gulf Oil farmout acreage was attributable
to Amoco's interest. Amoco had the right to all production from the farmout
acreage until payout; if Gulf Oil backed in for a working interest after payout,
Gulf Oil's share was to be deducted entirely from Amoco's interest. Amoco was
and for the
bearing the costs of production for the well for its own lease acreage
°
farmout acreage. No undue advantage was obtained by Amoco.'
B. Gas PurchaseContract
The plaintiff natural gas producer in DeNovo Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Louisiana
Intrastate Gas Corp." brought suit against the purchaser under a gas purchase
contract for failure of the purchaser to reimburse the producer for construction
of a pipeline used to deliver gas to the purchaser. The purchaser claimed it had

8. 637 So. 2d 1202 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994). The author should disclose he gave testimony in
this proceeding. He is in no way related to or associated with the named plaintiff.
9. Id. at 1203-05.
10. Id. at 1207-08.
11. 638 So. 2d 358 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
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paid the sums due, amendments made to the contract eliminated the obligation
to reimburse, and a clause of the contract limited claims that could be made for
"undercharges" to those made within twenty-four months of the undercharge. An
additional defense concerned application of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978
(NGPA) 2 and whether this issue should be resolved first by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC). The court found reimbursement of pipeline
construction costs were not part of the price of the natural gas. 3 The producer
and purchaser both reasonably concluded that, under a FERC order, the
reimbursement, in addition to the maximum lawful price for gas, could not be
paid for a period of several years. It was not necessary, however, that payments
made during that time as part of the maximum lawful price of the natural gas be
considered as part of the reimbursement of the construction costs. Once the
NGPA maximum lawful price was no longer an effective limiting factor on the
gas price, the parties amended the gas purchase contract price by letter
agreements. The court found these amendments were not intended to supersede
the reimbursement clause of the contract. 4 The court ruled in favor of the
purchaser on the application of the twenty-four month limitation contained in the
contract, holding that, once it became possible to charge for the reimbursement
of costs, the special limitation began to accrue. 5
III. CONVEYANCING
A. PartitionInterpretation-TheMissing Comma
A conveyance arising as part of a partition was construed in Doyal v.
Pickett.'6 In the succession of Aubrey Arnold, his widow was recognized as
owner of one-half of Blackacre and their two daughters as naked owners of onefourth each, with usufruct in favor of the widow. One of the daughters, plaintiff
Doyal, sought to partition the property in 1969 but then executed a compromise
deed in 1971 in exchange for a $10,000 payment. The deed's second clause
provided that plaintiff transfer:
All of her right, title and interest in and to all of the property that was
property of the marital community of acquets and gains existing
between her mother, Evelyn Allison Arnold Mason, and her late father,
Aubrey Franklin Arnold, except that she is to keep all sums and
movable property heretofore received and particularly including all of
her right, title and interest in and to all of the following described

12. Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 42

U.S.C.).
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 363-64.
Id. at 365-66.
Id. at 366-67.
628 So. 2d 184 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 55

property, to-wit: [the home place and other immovable property are
specifically described].'"
The third clause of the deed reserved her interest in minerals in the "hereinabove
described lands."
The plaintiff claimed the compromise deed reserved to her an interest in the
home place and other immovable property, while the defendant contended the
deed transferred the plaintiffs interest. The court, holding for the defendant,
interpreted the deed's second clause as though there were a comma after the
word "received." Under such an interpretation, only "all sums and movable
property heretofore received" were excepted from the transfer." The plaintiffs
interest in the home place and immovable property were thus conveyed. The
court's interpretation was buttressed by the fact the $10,000 payment far
exceeded the value of the other matters in the dispute and the fact it would have
been rather pointless to have sought a partition so as to get out of co-ownership
and then not resolve that point of contention. Moreover, the clear reservation of
mineral rights in the third clause was inconsistent with the claim the second
clause retained ownership in immovable property. Had the immovable property
been "excepted" as plaintiff claimed, there would have been no reason to
"reserve" minerals. The court's premise is dead-center accurate, and its
reasoning cannot be faulted. An additional noteworthy element of the decision
was the principle, applied by the court, that a deed will be construed against the
seller and/or drafter of the instrument.1 9
B. Partition-Dividedand Undivided Interests
The case of Campbell v. Pasternack Holding Co.20 presented several
significant issues concerning partition: (1) whether a co-owner with perfect
ownership may partition by licitation property as to which another undivided
interest has been bifurcated into usufructuary and naked interests; and (2)
whether the same plaintiff co-owner, who has no attendant mineral rights, may
partition by licitation only her "surface" interest in the land, where one or more
of the defendant co-owners has full interests in the land, including mineral rights.
The answer to both of these was in the affirmative. In so holding, the court
overruled one case2' and ruled that Louisiana Civil Code article 543, as
amended in 1983, is to be applied to partitions of co-owned property, even when
the interests were acquired under pre-existing law and jurisprudence.2 This
article was amended to provide as follows:

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 187.
Id. at 188.
Id at 187.
625 So. 2d 477 (La. 1993).
Cahn v. Cahn, 468 So. 2d 1176 (La. 1985).
Campbell, 625 So. 2d at 481-84.
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When property is held in indivision, a person having a share in full
ownership may demand partition of the property in kind or by licitation,
even though there may be other shares in naked ownership and usufruct.
A person having a share in naked ownership only or in usufruct
only does not have this right, unless a naked owner of an undivided
share and a usufructuary of that share jointly demand partition in kind
or by licitation, in which event their combined
shares shall be deemed
23
to constitute a share in full ownership.
The result in this case is not an unreasonable application of Article 543. Yet
it does not resolve a problem that developed after the decision in Steele v.
Denning.2 4 Even though Pasternack speaks only to partition by licitation, it
does not make clear the relationship between the owner of a mineral right who
was not a party to the partition and the owner of the land after the partition.
Under one view, the mineral right is "unaffected" but can be exercised by the
mineral owner; whereas before the partition, the mineral right owner could not
have exercised it without consent of all co-owners.3 The resolution of this
issue would significantly affect the value of land involved in licitation.
IV. LEASE MAINTENANCE AND ROYALTY PAYMENTS

A.

Putting in Default

The 1984 revision of the law of obligations eliminated the active and passive
breach distinction which existed when Article 135 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code2 6 was enacted. That article incorporates the standards of the Louisiana
Civil Code. Prior jurisprudence held a lessee must be put in default of its
implied, lease obligations prior to commencement of a suit. In Taussig v.
Goldking PropertiesCo.,7 the trial court found the lessees had abandoned the
leases because of their failure to undertake additional development and treated
the abandonment as an active breach which obviated the need to put the lessee
in default. The court of appeals, however, held a formal placing in default was
required. The attorneys for the lessors had made demands for lease cancellation,

23. The legislation was intended, apparently, to overrule the decision in Pastemack v. Samuels,
415 So. 2d 211 (La. 1982). See generally Andrew L. Gates, 111,Partition of Land and Mineral
Rights, 43 La. L. Rev. 1119 (1983): Jeanne M. Gravois. Comment, The Revision ofthe Louisiana CoOwnership Law, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 1261 (1991); Christina Berthelot Peck, Note. Civil Code Article543
and the Problem of Partition by Licitation of Property Subject to a Usufruct, 43 La. L. Rev. 787
(1983).
24. 456 So. 2d 992 (La. 1984).
25. See Patrick H. Martin, Mineral Rights, Developments in the Law, 1989.1990, 51 La. L. Rev.
335, 336-37 (1990); Patrick H. Martin, Mineral Rights, Developments in the Law, 1984-1985, 46
La. L. Rev. 569, 587-89 (1986).
26. La. R.S. 31:135 (1989).
27. 495 So. 2d 1008 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986), writ denied, 502 So. 2d I11 (1987).
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not for development. A demand for cancellation, the court held, is not a
substitute for a placing in default. 8s Furthermore, the trial court's conclusion
that a passive breach had been transformed into an active one, obviating the
necessity of placing in default under the Louisiana Civil Code's standards, was
in error. The court of appeals stated: "Since the duty to develop is an implied
obligation, the jurisprudence has consistently held that a breach of this duty is
passive, and a formal placing in default is required before judicial intervention
may be sought."29
An unreported decision, Fina Oil & Chemical Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration
& ProductionCo.,3 held the law applicable to mineral leases was changed with
the revision of the obligations articles. Comment (e) to Louisiana Civil Code
article 1989 of the 1984 law of obligations revision indicates it was not the
intention of the drafters to change the operation of the Louisiana Mineral Code.
Strictly speaking, the approach of the Fina decision is not necessarily inconsistent with comment (e). There was no express provision in the Louisiana Mineral
Code for putting in default for breach of the implied obligations of the lessee
under the prudent operator standard of Article 122 of the Louisiana Mineral
Code, 31 other than the provision in Article 13632 regarding drainage.
The court in Hunt v. Stacy 33 came to a different conclusion from the Fina
court on the effect of the 1984 law of obligations changes. The Hunt court held
the Louisiana Mineral Code continues the active/passive breach distinction
despite the change in the Louisiana Civil Code. The Hunt court quotes from the
comment to Louisiana Mineral Code article 135, 3' which observes the active/passive breach distinction, and then concludes: "It thus appears that the
legislature intended to retain the distinction between passive and active breaches,
as well as the jurisprudence regarding these classifications, at least as to contracts
involving oil, gas and other minerals. Accordingly, we conclude that passive
breaches do still exist." 35 The problem with the court's approach is that the text
of Article 135 does not attempt to incorporate a static approach to the Louisiana
Civil Code. Moreover, it seems questionable to quote a 1974 comment on
legislative intent to ascertain the intent of a 1984 legislative act. It also appears
troublesome to have the comments to the Louisiana Mineral Code articles, in
effect, freeze the Louisiana Civil Code to what it provided in 1974. This would
seem to require the courts to recognize the continued existence of the older

28.
29.
Cir.),
30.
Cir.),
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1014 (citing Trinidad Petroleum v. Pioneer Natural Gas, 416 So. 2d 290 (La. App. 3d
writ denied, 422 So. 2d 154 (1982)).
No. 95891 (La. Dist. Terrebonne Parish Apr. 2), writ denied, No. CW90-0846 (La. App. 1st
writ denied, 568 So. 2d 1086 (1990).
La. R.S. 31:122 (1989).
La. R.S. 31:136 (1989).
632 So. 2d 872 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994).
La. R.S. 31:135 cmt. (1989).
Id. at 875.
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version of the Louisiana Civil Code in relation to mineral leases and to continue
to develop a jurisprudence of active/passive breaches without a current Louisiana
Civil Code basis for this. Clearly, the Louisiana Civil Code is to apply where
it is not expressly or implicitly in conflict with the Louisiana Mineral Code.36
There is nothing in the text of the Louisiana Mineral Code that conflicts with the
1984 Louisiana Civil Code revisions, except for Articles 137-1403 dealing with
royalty payment. It is, however, desirable to require written notice to lessees.38
B. Production in Paying Quantities
Virtually all mineral leases provide they will continue beyond the primary
term for as long as there is production. If production ceases, the lease terminates
automatically, unless saved by some other provision of the lease. The term
"production" has been interpreted to mean "production in paying quantities. 39
The Louisiana Mineral Code, in Article 124,40 codifies.the judicial interpretation
of this requirement. What constitutes production in paying quantities has been
the subject of repeated litigation. In Lege v. Lea Exploration Co.,4 1 the plaintiff
lessors contended the lease had ceased because there was no longer production
in paying quantities. The question of paying quantities turned on the accounting
treatment of expenditures by the lessee for disposal of salt water. The lessee had
installed a saltwater disposal system at substantial expense. The plaintiffs
contended the expenses were greater than the value of the production. The
lessee contended the system costs were in the nature of capital expenditures that
should be amortized over a period of years. If the lessee's capitalization of these
costs was correct, then the lease did produce in paying quantities in the relevant
period. To this the plaintiffs responded the costs should be immediately
expensed because the disposal system substituted for trucking the salt water away
for disposal, and such lifting 42
and trucking of salt water would have been properly
treated as a current expense.
IThe court agreed with the lessee that capitalization
was the correct approach.
Ruling for the lessee was clearly consistent with the standard of the Louisiana
Mineral Code. The Louisiana Mineral Code provides the production in paying
quantities standard looks to whether the lessee is acting as a prudent operator in

36. See Article 2 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, La. R.S. 31:2 (1989).
37. La. R.S. 31:137-:140 (1989 & Supp. 1995).
38. It may be noted both cases discussed here would have come out the same way on alternative
grounds cited by the courts. The Fina court held if notice and demand for performance were
required, the plaintiff had provided adequate notice. The Hunt court held the leases in question
required notice of breach and a sixty day opportunity to comply with the demand for performance.
Such demand for performance was not made and the suit was premature by virtue of the lease
requirement.
39. See, e.g., Coyle v. North Am. Oil Consol., 201 La. 99, 115, 9 So. 2d 473, 479 (1942).
40. La. R.S. 31:124 (1989).
41. 631 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 1112 (1994).
42. Id. at 718.
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seeking to make a profit or minimize losses and is not merely continuing
production for speculative purposes.43 The court declared "we are unable to
accept the premise of plaintiff's position, that the nature of a lessee's cost is
determined strictly by the substitution accomplished."" Nor was the matter of
whether it was a pre- or post-production expense a determining factor. The
lessee clearly was not acting for speculative purposes, and a prudent operator
would continue to produce under the circumstances. The decision is undoubtedly
correct.
C. Assignment Clause
The proper application of an assignment clause of a lease was at issue in
Hanks v. Wilson.4 In a series of transactions, Hanks acquired a fractional
mineral servitude and the right to receive royalties to be paid under a lease
affecting the mineral servitude subject to the occurrence of a condition. The
right to receive royalty attributable to the mineral servitude had been purchased
by the Wilsons, and they were to continue to receive the royalties until they had
recouped their investment in purchasing the royalty together with interest. Hanks
wrote a series of letters to the lessee notifying the lessee of the conveyances and
of certain claims regarding the number of acres in the lease tract and the proper
division interests of the royalty. The fourth letter by Hanks claimed the
condition that gave him a present right to receive royalty had occurred. The
Wilsons, however, claimed the condition had not yet occurred. In response to
the differing claims, Amoco suspended payment of the share of royalty in dispute
and invoked a concursus proceeding to determine the ownership of the mineral
royalty.46
The trial court found that the condition had occurred prior to suspension of
the royalty payments and that the Wilsons owed Hanks over $49,000, which they
had been overpaid. The trial court further ruled the actions of Amoco in not
paying Hanks on the basis of his fourth letter and in suspending the royalty
payments pending the court action were reasonable and Amoco was not liable
to Hanks for the money overpaid to the Wilsons. 7 On appeal, the first circuit
affirmed. It ruled under paragraph 9 of the mineral lease that the lessee was
relieved from the obligation to pay royalties to the assignee of the lessor's
royalty rights, until the lessee had been provided with appropriate evidence of the
change in royalty ownership.48 From the information subrhitted, Amoco could

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Article 124 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, La. R.S. 31:124 (1989).
Lege, 631 So. 2d at 719.
633 So. 2d 1345 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1345-47.
Id. at 1347.

48. Id. at 1350-51. The pertinent paragraph provides:
All provisions hereof shall inure to the benefit of and bind the successors and assigns (in
whole or in part) of Lessor and Lessee, but regardless of any actual or.constructive notice

19951

MINERAL RIGHTS

not determine the condition to which Hanks's interest was subject had in fact
occurred. The lease clause protected Amoco from claims of improper.royalty
payment. This decision is consistent with prior cases applying similar or
identical assignment clauses of mineral leases. 9
D. Contra Non Valentem
The plaintiffs in La PlaqueCorp. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc." were owners of
an overriding royalty created out of a state-owned lease. The defendant was the
lessee. Plaintiffs asserted the lessee had failed to pay proper royalty for many
years and the lessee was therefore liable for underpayment from 1972 through
1989. A particular focus in the case was on a gas purchasing contract the
lessee's predecessor, Gulf Oil Corporation (Gulf), had entered into in 1964 with
Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation (Texas Eastern). The gas purchasing
contract was a "warranty contract" pursuant to which the producer was required
to provide a certain volume of gas at a fixed price (approved and limited by the
Federal Power Commission), regardless of the source of the natural gas. The
defendant asserted plaintiffs' claims had prescribed under the three-year
prescriptive period set forth in Louisiana Civil Code article 3494, precluding all
claims prior to June 5, 1987. The plaintiffs responded that prescription had not
run because of the doctrine of contra non valentem; the defendant, they asserted,
had not informed them of facts that would have enabled them to bring their
claim earlier.5 '
The trial court concluded the doctrine of contra non was applicable and
overruled the exception of prescription. The appeals court overturned the
decision, finding the information on the market value of the gas was in the
public records and available to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs had been advised,
during various periods of the relevant time, by knowledgeable consultants. "A
plaintiff," the court ruled, "will be deemed to know that which he could have

thereof, no change in the ownership of the land or any interest therein or change in the
capacity or status of Lessor or any other owner of rights hereunder, whether resulting
from sale or other transfer, inheritance, interdiction, emancipation, attainment of majority
or otherwise, shall impose any additional burden on Lessee, or be binding on Lessee for
making any payments hereunder unless, at least forty-five (45) days before any such
payment is due, the record owner of this lease shall have been furnished with certified
copy of recorded instrument or judgment evidencing such sale, transfer or inheritance, or
with evidence of such change in status or capacity of Lessor or other party owning rights
hereunder. The furnishing of such evidence shall not affect the validity of payments

theretofore made in advance.
Id.at 1350.
49. Lapeze v. Amoco Prod. Co.. 842 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1988); Hibbert v. Mudd, 294 So. 2d 518
(La. 1974); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 La. 576, 46 So. 2d 907 (1950).
50. 638 So. 2d 354 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).

51. Id.at 354-55.
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learned from reasonable diligence." 2 The court was evidently influenced in
part by the fact the named plaintiff was a corporation set up specifically to
pursue the claim of underpayment of royalty. Three shareholders, directors and
officers of La Plaque Corporation, had been involved, in various capacities, in
management of the royalty interests in litigation for many years prior to suit
being filed. They had been intimately aware of the Gulf/Texas Eastern contract.
The exception of prescription was thus sustained.
E. Class Action Denied
The litigation fallout from Frey v. Amoco ProductionCo. 53 concerning the
liability of lessees for royalty on take-or-pay payments and settlements, continues
and will no doubt result in reported cases for some years to come. An effort to
bring a Frey-type claim as a class action was rejected in Stoute v. Wagner &
Brown.54 The plaintiffs sought to certify a class action, seeking to proceed as
a class consisting of all mineral lessors and royalty owners in the Moore-Sams
Field, against the defendant producers. The court found many different contracts
were involved-mineral leases, gas purchase agreements and settlements-and
accordingly, many different rights, remedies, and defenses were likewise
involved. It would not, the court concluded, be more efficient to try these
disputes in a class action."5
V.

OIL WELL LIEN Ac&'

The case of GuichardDrilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Services, Inc.,57 raised
the question whether a creditor, when executing on his oil well lien, can seize
the ownership interests of parties who were not made defendants in the seizure
proceedings. The court also had to resolve the issue whether seizure, pursuant
to an oil well lien against one party who purportedly has an ownership interest
in the encumbered property, prevents other owners who were not made
defendants from raising the defense of peremption. The court held, while the Oil
Well Lien Act creates a right in rem-a lien and privilege in favor of certain
persons over certain property, fundamental due process requires the owner of the
"rem" be afforded notice and the opportunity of a hearing."8 Because the
lienholder instituted legal proceedings against only defendant Alpine Energy
Services, Inc. (Alpine), and not the intervenors, in attempting to enforce its lien,

52. Id. at 358 (citing Matthews v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 521 So. 2d 1192, 1197 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1988)).
53. 603 So. 2d 166 (La. 1992).
54. 637 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994).
55. Id. at 1200.
56. La. R.S. 4:4861-:4867 (1991 & Supp. 1995).
57. 635 So. 2d 1312 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted, 642 So. 2d 1303 (1994).
58. Id. at 1315-16.
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the lienholder's security interest, recognized in a default judgment against Alpine,
could be recognized as encumbering only Alpine's ownership interests in the
property encumbered. The court went on to rule the Oil Well Lien Act is a
statute of peremption s9 Peremption is a time limit for the existence of a right,
and unless it is timely exercised, the right is extinguished. The suit against
Alpine did not interrupt peremption against the intervenors in this litigation.
Thus, the lienholder's lien rights had been extinguished by the passage of time.

VI. CONSERVATION REGULATION60
A. Louisiana Well Cost Statute
A complex issue of well costs was reolved in Tex/Con Oil & Gas Co. v.
Batchelor.61 This case arose from revisions of units in the South Lake Arthur
Field. The revisions changed the ownership interests in the units as new acreage
was brought in and some acreage was taken out. A dispute arose over the
method of allocating well costs among the new and former owners of interests
in the units. The commissioner applied the "dollar-for-dollar" method of
depreciation. Under this approach, the actual reasonable well cost was reduced
by the amount of monies received from the prior production on the original unit,
less severance taxes. Because the money received from production exceeded the
reasonable well costs for each well, the commissioner concluded the cost
chargeable by the owners of the original units to the subsequent owners of the
62
revised units was zero.
The owners of the original units sought judicial review and won a temporary
reversal. The trial court ruled Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:10(A)(2) and the
custom and usage of the industry require the application of the unit of production
depreciated well cost reduction method of accounting. Under this method, well
costs are reduced by the percentage of depletion of the unit's total recoverable
reserves caused by production prior to unit revision. The appellate court,
however, reinstated the commissioner's order based on the "dollar-for-dollar"
method and rejected the trial court's determination that as to certain owners the
dollar-for-dollar method would constitute a taking of property by the state
without just compensation. The court concluded the commissioner had properly
applied the then-applicable version of the statute, which mandated the commissioner apply the dollar-for-dollar method of depreciation.63 Louisiana Revised
Statutes 30:10(A)(2)(d), as it then existed, dictated that well costs "be reduced

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id at 1316.
La. R.S. 30:10 (1989 & Supp. 1995).
634 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ denied, 635 So. 2d 1102 (1994).
Id. at 904-05. See also Desormeaux v. Inexco Oil Co.. 298 So. 2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir.),

writ refused, 302 So. 2d 37 (1974).
63. Tex/Con Oil & Gas Co., 634 So. 2d at 908-09. The two methods are discussed in Robert T.
Jorden, Unit Well Cost Adjustment in Louisiana, 38 La. Min. L. Inst. 82 (1992).
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to account for monies received from prior production"; this phraseology
contemplated use of the dollar-for-dollar method of determining well costs.
It should be noted Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:10(A)(2)(d) was amended
by Act 595 of 1991. As the appellate court observed in this case,6 the
amendment changed the phrase "shall be reduced to account for monies received
from prior production" to "shall be reduced in the same proportion as the
recoverable reserves in the unitized pool have been recovered by prior
production." This amendment evidences a clear change in the method of
determining well costs to a unit of production well cost reduction method and
provides further support for the court's conclusion that prior to the 1991
amendment, Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:10(A)(2)(d) mandated the use of the
dollar-for-dollar method.
B. Balancing of NaturalGas
In Hunt Oil Co. v. Batchelor,6s the litigation arose from revisions of units
in the South Lake Arthur Field that changed the ownership interests in the units;
new acreage was brought in and some acreage was taken out. The hearings were
concluded on October 18, 1989, but the order was not issued until January 22,
1990. The order was effective as of October 18, 1989, but substantial production
of natural gas took place between that date and the January 22, 1990 issuance of
the order (the "critical period"). A dispute arose over how to account to new
owners for the production that took place in this period. The overproduced
parties contended there should be balancing-in-kind, allowing the underproduced
parties to take a disproportionate share of the gas and sell it themselves to make
up for the period for which they were underproduced. The underproduced
parties sought a cash accounting based on what the overproduced parties actually
realized from the sale of the gas during the critical period."' Applying the
criteria of prior cases, 67 the court found cash balancing was necessary where the
underproduced party could not have taken the gas at the time of production and
an inordinate amount of time would have been required for balancing-in-kind to
have been effected.68 The court concluded "balancing in kind would be unfair
and unjust in this case because plaintiffs would further lose the time value of
money. '6, 9 The Louisiana Supreme Court had granted a writ for review of this
case at the time of this publication. Perhaps the supreme court court will
consider the possibility of a reversal of circumstances in which the overproduced

64. Tex/Con Oil & Gas Co., 634 So. 2d at 908.
65. 633 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), rev'd, 644 So. 2d 191 (1994).
66. Id. at 260.
67. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 566 So. 2d 138 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs denied, 571 So. 2d
627, 628 (1990); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writs
denied, 520.So. 2d 118, 118 (1988).
68. Hunt Oil Co., 633 So. 2d at 262.

69. Id.
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party insists on cash balancing in a time of rising gas prices, while the
underproduced party seeks balancing-in-kind. A rule that favors balancing-inkind is likely to be more fair overall than a rule that favors underproduced or
overproduced parties.
C. Operator'sRelationship to Nonoperator
Three interrelated cases70 have resulted in several decisions holding the
operator of a compulsory unit who sells unit production must account to unleased
owners under a theory of quasi-contract rather than conversion. Because the
plaintiffs were treated as unleased owners, the operator was obligated to account
in money rather than through a balancing-in-kind.. All three cases grew out of
certain of the same facts reported in Taylor v. Woodpecker Corp.7' The issue
involved whether an unleased mineral interest owner has a right or cause of
action against a purchaser of unit production to recover the value of his share.
The unit involved in the litigation was a forty-acre unit established in 1942 by
Order No. 24-D. In 1979 a well was drilled on acreage within the 1942 unit by
E. C. Wentworth, and Ashland purchased production from the well. In 1986 the
lessor-plaintiffs (Taylors) filed a lawsuit against their lessee, Woodpecker
Corporation, and against Wentworth, the well operator, which led to the supreme
court decision noted above.72 This current phase of the litigation arose in 1991
when the plaintiffs filed suits against Wedon Smith and David New Operating
Company, Inc., and a suit against E. C. Wentworth and Woodpecker Corporation
that was transferred to a different district because of the naming of the state
agency as a third party defendant. Common to all three reported decisions was
the defendants' assertions that the plaintiffs' claims were governed by a one-year
prescriptive period applicable to conversion. The appellate courts in all three
cases held the obligation of the unit operator to a nonoperator under the pooling
statute gives rise to an action in quasi contract. 7" Since the operator had the
legal right to sell the production of the nonoperator, it would not be appropriate
to apply the prescriptive period that governs wrongful taking or conversion. One
of the courts further stated:
We agree that LSA-R.S. 30:10 A(3) gives an unleased landowner a
cause of action in quasi contract under these Civil Code articles. The
unit operator acts as a negotiorum gestor or manager of the owner's
business in selling the owner's proportionate share of oil and gas
produced. In return for the right to sell the share of production of the

70. Taylor v. Woodpecker Corp., 633 So. 2d 1308 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994); Taylor v. David New
Operating Co., 619 So. 2d 1251 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 625 So. 2d 1046 (1993); Taylor v.

Smith, 619 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 625 So. 2d 1038 (1993).
71. 562 So. 2d 888 (La. 1990).
72. Id. at 889-90.
73.

Woodpecker Corp., 633 So. 2d at 1313; David New Operating Co., 619 So. 2d at 1255; Smith,

619 So. 2d at 888.
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unleased landowner, the unit operator is obligated by law "without any
agreement" to pay the unleased landowner his proportionate share of
proceeds within 180 days of the sale of production. The "purely
voluntary act" of assuming the position of unit operator, and thereby
obtaining the right to sell the unleased interest owner's share of
production, results in this obligation to account to the unleased interest
owner pursuant to LSA-R.S. 30:10 A(3). 4

D. Doctrineof PrimaryJurisdictionApplied
Based on the decision in Magnolia Coal Terminal v. Phillips Oil Co.," the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Mills v. Davis Oil Co.,76
has ruled the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is followed in Louisiana as a matter
of substantive law which the federal courts are bound to follow. The case grew
out of a sheriffs sale of a tract of land, a portion of which had been included in
a unit. The sale had the effect of extinguishing a lease. The former lessee was
required to pay for the value of the production it had obtained, less the costs of
production. Controversy arose over the proper costs, and the district court
declined to exercise jurisdiction over Mills' well cost dispute and instead
deferred the matter to the Commissioner of Conservation. Under Louisiana
law," such deference is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.
The court held "Louisiana's doctrine of primary jurisdiction is substantive and
it required the lower court to exercise its discretion as if it were a Louisiana state
court.""8 The plaintiff claimed $11,735,000 in civil penalties under Louisiana
Revised Statutes 30: 10(A)(3). These were properly denied by the court, as those
civil penalties were applicable to violations of the conservation statute.
The court's opinion reflects a matter of confusion in the minds and writings
of some Louisiana attorneys. The court refers to "the Louisiana Mineral Code"
when citing to a section of Title 30 of the Revised Statutes.79 This is incorrect.
The Louisiana Mineral Code is that body of articles found in Title 31 that were
enacted initially in 1974.80 The sections of Title 30 pertaining to the authority
of the Commissioner of Conservation and to conservation regulation generally
are more properly referred to as the "conservation statute" (though in fact a
series of statutes are reflected therein).

74. Woodpecker Corp., 633 So. 2d at 1313.
75. 576 So. 2d 475 (La. 1991).
76. 11 F.3d 1298 (5th Cir. 1994). See also La Plaque Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 638 So. 2d
354 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994), discussed supra text accompanying notes 50-52 (applying the primary
jurisdiction doctrine to an issue related to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission authority).
77. See, e.g., Magnolia Coal Terminal, 576 So. 2d at 489 (denying application for rehearing).
78. Mills, IIF.3d at 1304.
79. Id. at 1305.
80. Article 1 of the Louisiana Mineral Code, La. R.S. 31:1 (1989).

